Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 1

Issue 1

Article 4

12-15-1973

The Small Claims Court: Justice for the Poor or Convenience for
the Businessman
Charles T. Eye

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Judges Commons

Recommended Citation
Charles T. Eye The Small Claims Court: Justice for the Poor or Convenience for the Businessman, 1 Pepp.
L. Rev. Iss. 1 (1973)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol1/iss1/4

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

Comments

The Small Claims Court: Justice
for the Poor or Convenience
for the Businessman

The purpose of this comment is to examine the performance of
Small Claims Courts and their function within our judicial system.
This subject has been covered in previous law review articles,
many of which are cited in this comment. Some of the previous articles used a statistical approach as does this one.'
The obvious question then is, why another comment on Small
Claims Courts? One reason is that previous article have called for
future research. Additional independent research tends to reinforce the studies previously made. Further, in spite of valid criticism and suggested reform there has been no substantial change in
the justice given the indigent litigant in Small Claims Courts.
This comment may. be distinguished from previous articles in the
following ways: First, the statistical research is based upon a
1. For a statistical summary of the Pomona Small Claims Court study
see Appendix A. For information on the general population of the Pomona
Judicial District see Appendix B.
This research was done while this writer was clerking for Mr. Randolph
Weltner, the director of the San Gabriel Valley Legal Aid Office in Pomona.
It was not until after the research was completed, and the conclusions made,
conclusions essentially identical to those in this comment, that the existence
of the previous law review articles were discovered. It is striking that all
researchers independently came to the same conclusions based on very
similar statistics.

small community 2 whereas previous articles were based upon data
from either distinctly urban or distinctly rural areas. Second,
the statistics were taken at a different time. The previous articles were all written prior to 1969. Third, the statistics are
taken from a much larger sample than previous articles, and include a judge by judge comparison. Fourth, each new article
gives more information upon which future cases can rely. 4 And
finally, the recent California Supreme Court decision in Brooks v.
Small Claims Court" made another comment especially timely.
This decision represents the first significant step towards reforming the Small Claims Courts and will be discussed in detail later
in this article.
In order to evaluate the present operation of the Small Claims
Court fairly, it is necessary to consider some historical informa-

tion concerning its origin and purpose.
ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF SMALL CLAIMS COURTS
Long before statutes were enacted establishing Small Claims
Courts, legal scholars and judges advocated the need for them.
Chief Justice William Howard Taft has been credited with giving
the vital impetus needed when he enunciated the principle that
something must be devised "by which everyone however lowly
and however poor, however unable by his means to employ a lawyer and to pay court costs, shall be furnished the opportunity to
6
set the fixed machinery of justice going".
Legislation was enacted in 1921 providing for Small Claims
Courts in California. 7 The first case interpreting the act to come befor the appellate courts stated that the apparent intention of the
California Legislature was to formulate a system to operate for
the rich and poor alike.8 The high expectations of those early days
were reflected by the words of one law review writer when he
described the plight of the poor as a situation in which they were
unable to get justice due to inability to afford an attorney and
2. See Appendix B.

3. See Appendix A, Tables VIII and IX.
4. In an interview with Mrs. Sally Hart Wilson, the attorney representing the defendant in Brooks v. Small Claims Court, Mrs. Wilson stated that
she was prompted by the several law review articles to challenge the constitutionality of the undertaking or deposit requirement of CALIFORNIA CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1171 and § 11711.

5. Brooks v. Small Claims Court, 8 Cal.3d 661, 504 P.2d 1249, 105 Cal.

Rptr. 785 (1973).

6. Shontz, Speedy, Informal Justice of Small Claims Court described
by Judge, 15 CALIF. S.B.J. 273, 275.
7. CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 927 (1921) now § 117.

8. Leuschen v. Small Claims Court, 191 Cal. 133, 215 P. 391 (1923).
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pay the costs of a trial. He stated: "No reforms to remedy this
lamentable situation offer greater promise than the Small Claims
Courts and the Conciliation Courts for small causes"Y Many judges
also seemed to feel that the Small Claims Courts were working
well. In a 1946 case, Justice Peters, after pointing out that justice
should not be a rich man's luxury, and that those interested in
the administration of justice had struggled unsuccessfully to provide justice for the poor litigant, stated his belief that the solution
to this problem had been the creation of the Small Claims or Conciliation Courts.' 0
During the first twenty-five years of the Small Claims Courts in
California, the great hope of the scholars and judges seemed to
have been realized. This attitude was exemplified by the Honorable Orfa Jean Shontz, a judge in the Los Angeles Small Claims
Court, who believed that the Small Claims Court was "serving a
very special and present need". In a 1940 article Judge Shontz
said: "In meeting the new conditions, in seeing to it that the
poor man, and the poor woman, have an equal chance at justice
with those who are better off, the Small Claims Court helps to give
people a new faith in law and in government.""
Based on the above history, it seems reasonable to accept as a
basic premise that the founders of the Small Claims Courts had as
a major purpose the establishment of a forum in which the poor
could get justice. This comment will now move on to a consideration of whether or not this goal is being achieved today. As a
starting point, if the Small Claims Court is a forum for the poor,
it should follow that the poor would be the principle users of the
Small Claims Court.
THE USERS OF THE SMALL CLAIMS COURT

The policy behind the original enactment of the small claims proceedings was thought by some early authorities to assure that the
"Poor untrained litigant" would be the person who would make
the general use of the small claims court. 12 However, the study
9. 11 CALIF. L. REV. 276, 277 (1922).
10. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Small Claims Court, 76 Cal. App. 2d
379, 173 P.2d 38, 167 A.L.R. 820 (1946).
11. See Shontz, supra note 6, at 274.
12. See supra note 10, at 383, 173 P.2d at 41, 167 A.L.R. at 824.

of the Pomona Court showed only 33.9 per cent of the plaintiffs to
be private parties. 18 Recognizing that not even all of these private
parties were "poor untrained litigants", it is clear that the poor
14
are not the major users of the court.
A study made in 1963 showed that "business and government
interests initiated sixty per cent of all actions and individuals
defend more than eighty per cent of them".'
This study also revealed that more than half of all claims were group claims. Group
claims are several claims against different defendants filed at the
same time by a single plaintiff. The usual number of such claims
was between ten and fifteen. This is a positive indication that
business is making substantial use of the court.
Some experts, including members of the California Supreme
Court,' 6 have recognized that the original purpose of the Small
Claims Court has not survived. To enlighten anyone still clinging
to this belief, Judge Earl K. Adams has suggested a perusal of
any Plaintiff-Defendant Index in small claims proceedings. 1' Although the poor often appear in the Small Claims Court, it is not in
the capacity the original framers had in mind. Judge Adams
pointed out that the poor man most often appears as a defendant,
not as a plaintiff.
At this point, with the poor man identified as the most common
defendant versus the businessman as the most common plaintiff,
the next question to be considered is: What is the indigent defendant's chance of success when he is sued in small claims court?
CAN AN INDIGENT DEFENDANT WIN?

To begin with, in the Pomona study, almost 45 per cent of the
cases filed were never brought to trial.' 8 In some cases the plaintiff was unable to get the summons served on the defendant. Most
of the cases, however, were dismissed on plaintiff's motion. This
indicates that the defendant either paid the claim or entered into a
settlement with the plaintiff.
Of the cases decided by a judge, about 50 percent were default
13. See Appendix A, Table I.

14. It was impossible to determine which of the private parties were
indigents from the case file alone. It would be an interesting subject for
future research to personally call on the parties and make a determination
of what percentage actually fall into this class.
15. See supra note 10, at 383.
16. See infra, note 43, at 884.
17. Defendants' Right to Counsel in Small Claims-Real or Fictitional,
45 CALIF. S.B.J. 226 (1970).
18. See Appendix A, Table II.
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judgments. 19 The judgment was for the plaintiff in 98 per cent of
these default cases. 20 This statistic indicates that a judgment
for the plaintiff is substantially a "rubber stamp" decision, with
the court requiring little proving up in a default case.
Not including cases dismissed before trial and the default judgments, in only about 28 per cent of the remaining cases filed did
the defendant appear and contest the action. It can perhaps be argued that the 72 per cent of defendants who either paid or settled the claim before trial, or who let the plaintiff take a default
judgment, felt they really owed the debt. But, it can also be argued
that many who did not contest the action felt they had little
chance to win against the more capable businessman plaintiff. Irrespective of the merits of these arguments, it is clear that the
27.8 per cent of total defndants who went to trial in the Pomona
Court disputed the plaintiff's claim.
In the Pomona study the plaintiff won a judgment in 70.8 per
cent of the contested cases. 21 At first blush this statistic does not
really look so bad for the defendant. However, this percentage is
for every type of defendant against every type of plaintiff. Of
more interest, where a private party is the defendant and a business or government agency the plaintiff, the plaintiff had judgment in almost 93 per cent of the cases. 22 By comparison, in the
Oakland-Piedmont-Emeryville study, the business/agency plaintiff
had judgment in 90 per cent of the cases that went to judg23
ment.
If one is inclined to believe that this high percentage in favor of
the plaintiff can be justified by the rationalization that plaintiffs
generally do not file nonmeritorious claims, he need only reverse
the parties to see the reality of this situation. When the private
party is the plaintiff and the business or government agency the
defendant, the plaintiff had judgment in only 65.5 per cent of the
cases. 24 One reason for the failure of the private party as defendant is the high percentage of defaults. When a business was the
plaintiff and the defendant a private party the Pomona study
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
See Appendix A, Table IV.
Id.
See Appendix A, Table V.
See infra note 43, at 886.
See Appendix A, Table V.

showed 67.2 per cent defaulted. 25 When the parties were reversed, the business defendant defaulted in only 22.1 per cent of
the cases. 26 The private party's high rate of default is evidently
due to his fear of facing a business plaintiff in court. This is contrasted with the low 28.7 per cent of defaults when the plaintiff is
also a private party.2 7 It is of particular interest that the private party's percentage of default if not substantially greater than
the businessman's when the plaintiff is a private party.2 8 Since
any defendant will win more often in a contested case, this fear of
facing a businessman in court is a problem that must be overcome
if the private party is ever to receive justice in the Small Claims
29
Court.
It is interesting to note that when a system is working well, as
the Small Claims Courts evidently were in the early days, those
involved in its operation view it with both enthusiasm and humor. In 1940, Judge Shontz wrote:
"Material for many a human interest story, such as would tickle
the pen of OHenry or our California-acclimated Irvin ' 3Cobb,
0
unfolds itself daily in the Small Claims Court of Los Angeles."
It is doubtful that those involved, especially indigent defendants,
see such humor in the workings of the Small Claims Courts today.
Based on the premise that when a defendant goes to court in a
small claims case he disputes at least some part of the paintiff's
claim, it would seem reasonable that there would be a significant
disparity between the quantum of plaintiff's claim and the court's
judgment. This is the subject of the next part of this comment.
AMOUNT OF THE PLAINTIFFS JUDGMENT
From its inception, the Small Claims Court has been considered
a forum for conciliation and compromise. One early case spoke
of awards based on the application of common sense, with a spirit
of compromise and conciliation attending the proceedings. 3 1 Another leading case spoke of the theory of conciliation in that "disputes may be amicably settled if the parties are brought together,
face to face, before an unprejudiced and sympathetic judge, who
will painstakingly inform them of their rights under the law, suggest what may be done, and tactfully help them to an amicable
25. See Appendix A, Table VI.
26. Id.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Compare Appendix A, Tables VI and VII.
See Shontz, supra note 6, at 273.
Sanderson v. Nieman, 17 Cal. 2d 563, 110 P.2d 1025 (1941).
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ending of their controversy."3 2
Unfortunately, the Pomona study did not indicate much compromise and conciliation. The plaintiffs were awarded an average
of 92 per cent of the amount of their original claim. 33 Contributing factors to the 8 per cent reduction were payments made to
the plaintiffs before trial as well as errors, intentional and otherwise, in the amount of the plaiintiffs' original claim. For example, some plaintiffs in Small Claims Court file for an amount greater
than they actually believe their claim to be. In short, not only can
the defendant expect judgment against him in the overwhelm-

ing majority of cases, he can also expect the plaintiff to get substantially what he has asked for.

In proceeding to the next subject for consideration, let us accept,
for the sake of argument, the remote possibility that the claims of
the businessmen plaintiffs are so meritorious as to justify their
winning an average of 92 per cent of their cases. Let us also accept that an average award of 92 per cent of alleged loss is justified.
If we accept the equally remote possibility that the defendants'
disputes of the claims had no substantial merit, it would seem

that these possibilities are sound only if the various judges are relatively consistent in their decisions.
VARIATION AMONG THE JUDGES

In the Pomona study, the amount of the award shown as a percentage of the amount claimed showed an extreme spred of 18.3
per cent between the various judges. The lowest was 80.4 per cent
and the highest 98.7 per cent.8 4 The percentage of judgments
for plaintiff showed an even more remarkable extreme spread, 25.5
per cent between the various judges. The lowest was 74.5 per cent
and the highest 100 per cent.3 5 After considering the large number of claims decided by the various judges, should the idea still
seem reasonable that this variation can be explained by probability, there is one interesting observation that should put these
statistics in a realistic perspective. This is that the same judges
32. Flour City Fuel and Transfer v. Young, 150 Minn. 452, 185 N.W. 934
(1921).

33. See Appendix A, Table VIII.
34. Id.
35. See Appendix A, Table IX.

who gave higher percentages of judgments for the plaintiffs also
gave higher percentages of amount awarded to amount claimed.-6
At this point it seems appropriate to mention that it is not the
intention of this comment to prove or imply that any of the judges
of the Pomona Small Claims Court intentionally favor plaintiffs.
To the contrary, from actual observation of small claims trials
in the Pomona Court, all the judges seemed to be completely impartial. The only significant difference between their handling of
the cases which could contribute to an understanding of the variation between them was the depth with which they looked into
the individual cases. Other recent law review studies have made
similar observations. One such article stated: "In only a few of
the contested cases observed did the judge skillfully elicit both
sides of the story, help examine the witness and treat the
'37
plaintiff and defendant as equals in their courtroom contest.
Such inquiry is provided for by statute. The California Code of
Civil Procedure Section 117g states: "The judge or justice may also
make any investigation of the controversy between the parties either in or out of court and give judgment and make such orders as
to time of payment or otherwise as may, by him, be deemed to
be right and just". Although this statute is easy to understand it
seems quite difficult to apply effectively. One Small Claims
Court Judge has described the qualifications for a Small Claims
Court Judge in these words: "It requires an experienced judge
with endless concern for the petty troubles of common people. It
requires patient listening to those who rangle (sic) under a sense of
the trivial wrongs of daily life". 88
CONCLUSION
Without question, the Small Claims Courts are a model of efficiency. They furnish litigants with a speedy and effective means
of settling disputes. They also greatly aid the Municipal Courts in
eliminating additional litigation which could put their civil calendars even farther behind. In these goals the Small Claims Court has
been very successful. However, the very efficiency of the Small
Claims Courts may be, in fact, contributing to litigation. It has been
observed that "Sellers who extend credit to high risk buyers,
expecting a high proportion of default, rely heavily on efficiency
and streamlined collection operations which reduce the costs of
proceedings against delinquent accounts".8 9 It has also been
36.
37.
38.
39.

Compare Appendix A, Tables VIII and IX.
See infra note 47, at 1657.
See Shontz, supra note 6, at 276.
Resort to the legal process in collecting debts from high risk credit
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a common observation for many years that Small Claims Courts
are being used as collection agencies. 40 Thus, it has become habit
among businessmen to extend credit where credit should not and
would not be given but for the convenience of the Small Claims
Courts.
SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
There is certainly no single reform that can convert the Small
Claims Court back to its purpose as a forum for the poor. The following are a series of suggestions, any one of which will contribute
to this goal, and which together would represent a substantial improvement in the interest of small claims justice.
First, the judges should adopt new guidelines for Small Claims
Courts. It is the judges themselves who can exert the greatest influence. It is their responsibility to see that the Small Claims Courts
perform the intended function. Their discretion is great in small
claims cases and as the Pomona study has shown can do much to
assure justice in a particular case. Examples of suggested guidelines are: A judge is not to settle more than five cases per hour
(this would assure a more adequate considerration of each case);
a judge should require substantial proving-up of the plaintiffs evidence in a default; and a judge should explain to the defendant in
deatil any possible defenses (i.e. failure of consideration, unequal
bargaining power, etc.).
Next, the jurisdiction of the Small Slaims Court should be lowered from the present $50041 to an amount more consistent with
the original purpose of the Small Claims Court. Such a high dollar
limit makes it convenient for businessmen to collect their bills, but
it is difficult to see how this high dollar limit aids the poor. It
only increases the likelihood of a larger judgment against him
and it also decreases the possibility of a claim being reduced by
a debtor in order to avoid the necessity of seeking Municipal
Court action. In the Brooks case, mentioned in paragraph two as
a justification for writing this comment, the California Supreme
Court recognized that this high limit favors the interest of the instibuyers in Los Angeles-Alternative methods for allocating present costs.
14 UCLA INTRA. L. REV. 879, 885 (1967).
40. For an in depth discussion of this subject, see Small Claims Courts as
Collection Agencies, 4 STAN. L. REV. 237 (1951).
41. CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROC. § 117.

tutional creditor more than that of the individual. 42
In Brooks, the court discusses the requirements of an undertaking, which is described in California Code of Civil Procedure Section
1171 as the amount of the judgment plus interest due thereon, costs
awarded against the defendant, and the sum of $15 which is an "attorney fee"; and a deposit, described in Code of Civil Procedure
Section 11711 as a sum equal to the amount of the judgment, plus
costs, plus $25. The court held in Brooks that "the requirements of
an undertaking and a deposit are unconstitutional as they constitute
a taking of property without due process of law".
Defendant in that case contended that the undertaking requirement unconstitutionally deprived her of her property before
there had been a due process hearing with the right to counsel.
After deciding the case on the due process issue, the court went
on to discuss public policy reasons which they felt were supportive
of their conclusion. The court expressed concern about "certain
trends" in the use of the Small Claims Courts. These trends "have
been manifested in the type of litigants availing themselves of
the special forums". In support of this reasoning the court quoted
statistics from empirical studies which have shown a proportionately greater use of the small claims procedure by institutional
creditors than by individual creditors. For example, from the Oakland-Piedmont-Emeryville study it was found that only 34.7 per
cent of the plaintiffs were individuals. 43 Compare this with the 33.9
per cent individual plaintiffs found in the Pomona study. 4" The
court also noted that the defendant was almost invariably an individual. The Oakland-Piedmont-Emeryville study showed the
individual defendants to be 85.7 per cent of all defendants. The
Pomona study showed that in 82.6 per cent of the cases decided by
a judge an individual was the defendant. 45 Finally, the court
noted that 89.5 per cent of all judgments entered were in favor of
the plaintiff. The Pomona study showed 84.4 per cent.46 Noting
that the Oakland-Piedmont-Emeryville study was of a court in an
urban area the court pointed out that another study revealed
47
similar results in suburban communities.
42. See supra note 5, at 669, 504 P.2d at 1254-1255, 105 Cal. Rptr. at
790-791.
43. A Study of the Oakland-Piedmont-EmeryvilleJudicial District, 52
CALIF.

L. REV. 884 (1964).

44. See Appendix A, Table I.

45. See Appendix A, Table III.
46. See Appendix A, Table IV.
47. The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant as

Performed by the Small Claims Court in California, 21
1659-1661 (1969).

STAN.

L. REV. 1657,
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The court recognized several other factors which make the institutional creditor more likely than the individual to avail himself of the Small Claims Court. The factors were: the increase of
the monetary limit to $500,48 frequent use of venue rules to bring
an action at great distance from the residence of the defendant for
the purpose of getting an easy default judgment, and the inevitable proficiency developed by the institutional creditor through
repeated use of the courts, or by the institutional creditor acting
through a proper representative. These representatives may have
legal training but they do not fall within the statutory restriction
against appearance by an attorney.
Summing up the public policy issue, the Brooks Court said: "since
small claims actions often involve the inexperienced individual defendant facing the experienced institutional creditor plaintiff,
the small claims procedure should provide the defendant access to
counsel without being required to first file an undertaking".
It is further recommended that restrictions be placed on the use
of the Small Claims Courts by companies that make a practice of
using it to collect bills. This could be done by limiting the number of claims that can be filed by a plaintiff in a particular time
period. The filing of group claims should be similarly limited.
Since the Small Claims Court was created for special purposes, is
operated at public expense, and was never intended to replace
the Municipal Courts, it would seem that the legislature could
place such restrictions on its use. However, it is recognized that a
strong equal protection argument could be made against the constitutionality of such restrictions.
An even more drastic solution could be used. California and
other states could follow New York and exclude corporations, partnerships and associations from Small Claims Court. 49 Since this
would be a major change to our small claims court system, it
should only be considered as a last resort.
In any event, the common practice of using a special employee
whose duty it is to file claims and represent the corporation in
Small Claims Court should also be forbidden. These semi-professionals become equally as skilled in the narrow field of small claims
procedure as does a lawyer in regular litigation.
48. CAL. CODE OF CML PROC. § 117.

49. New York U.D.C.A.,

JUDICIARY

§ 1809, McKinney's (1973).

Unless the employee has duties which give him a peculiar knowledge of the facts, such as the general manager in the area or the
director or other officer, the judge should not allow this "semiprofessional" small claims specialist to represent the corporation in Small Claims Court. This was the language used in describing a "proper representative" for a corporation in Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Small Claims Court5" and repeated in the recent
case of Community National Bank v. Superior Court.5 1
Further, a defendant should have the option of having the case
tranferred to a night court. As with traffic citations, many defendants in small claims cases do not contest the plaintiff's claim
because it is too inconvenient. A defendant should not have
to chose between losing pay or even jeopardizing his job and allowing the plaintiff to take a default judgment.
Finally, some sort of guidance should be provided to a defendant in preparing his case. It has been suggested that "Failure to
provide defendants with any legal advice only tips the scales more
dramatically in the plaintiffs favor. '52 Although not the equivalent of legal counsel, a useful alternative might be a requirement
that a pamphlet be given to the defendant when he is served with
the Small Claims Court complaint. Such pamphlet should include
as much information as possible to aid the defendant in preparing
and defending his case. For example, an explanation of Small
Claims Court procedure, common defenses to contracts, places where
free or low cost legal counseling might be available and appeal
procedures. Another possibility is some sort of para-legal help for
the defendant furnished at the direction of the court. A full-time
paid employee, or where available, volunteer second and third year
law students could perform this function.
Perhaps the reform has finally begun. As stated above, the
Brooks case is a significant step in reforming the small claim procedure. Although there have been many statutory changes since
the Small Claims Court was established in 1921, the Brooks decision will force the first major change in the defendant's favor. However, it is the author's belief that the real value of this decision is
the court's public policy argument. The highest authority in California has now officially recognized that the small claims procedure has developed into a system which is fundamentally unfair to
the individual defendant. Although not the deciding issue in
50.
51.
51 Cal.
52.

See supra note 10, at 386, 173 P.2d at 42, 167 A.L.R. at 826.
Community National Bank v. Superior Court, 242 Cal. App. 2d 770,
Rptr. 782 (1966).
Small Claims Courts and the Poor, 42 S. CALL. REv. 502 (1968).
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Brooks, the public policy argument will very likely be followed in
future cases.
An example of an area where the public policy argument could
be used is an appeal of that part of the California Code of Civil Procedure Section 117g, which prevents an attorney from taking part in
Small Claims Court cases. The California Supreme Court in Brooks
recognized that this rule "seems to work to the parties disadvantage" in some instances. 53 From this language and the general public policy discussion, the California Supreme Court may now be
willing to again consider the constitutionality of this statute.
In conclusion, it is the legal community which must reform the
Small Claims Courts. Although this a court is of little interest to
most judges and of no interest to most attorneys, let us act now before we once again hear the cry that something must be devised
"by which everyone, however lowly and however poor, however unable by his means to employ a lawyer and pay court costs,
shall be furnished the opportunity to set the fixed machinery of
54
justice going".
CHARLES

T. EYE

53. See supra note 5, at 669, 504 P.2d at 1255, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
54. See supra note 6, at 275.

APPENDIX A
Statistical Data from Small Claims Cases filed during 1971 in the
Pomona Municipal Court
Table I
Plaintiffs Using the Court
Type of Plaintiff
Number of Claims
Business*
1379
Private Parties
742
Government Agencies
66
Total
2187

Per cent of all Claims
63.1
33.9
3.0
100.0

*Included in this category are 451 claims (20.6 per cent of all claims)
filed by finance companies.

Table II

Court Action on Claim
Court Action

Number of Claims

Not brought to trial**
Contested by

both parties
Default judgment

Total

I Per cent of all Claims

979

44.8

606

27.7

602

27.5

2187

100.0

**Of the 451 claims filed by finance companies, 246 (54.5 per cent) were
not brought to trial.

Table III
Defendants in Cases Decided by Judge
Type of Defendant I Number of Claims
Private Parties
Business or Govt.
Agency

Total

I Per cent of all Claims

998

82.6

210

17.4

1208

100.0

Small Claims Court
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Table IV
Outcome: by Type of Court Action
Number of I Judgment fort Percentage
Claims
Plaintiff
for Plaintiff.
Contested case
Default judgment
Contested and Default

606
602
1208

429
590
1019

70.8
98.0
84.4

Table V
Outcome: by Type of Plaintiff and Defendant
Plaintiff

Number of Judgment Percentage
Claims
for Plaintiff for Plaintiff

Defendant

Business or
Govt. Agency
Business or
Govt. Agency
Private Party
Private Party

Private Party
Business or
Govt. Agency
Business or
Govt. Agency
Private Party

646

599

92.7

65

54

83.1

145
352

95
271

65.5
77.0

Table VI
Defaults: by Type of Plaintiff and Defendant
Plaintiff
Business or
Govt. Agency
Business or
Govt. Agency
Private Party
Private Party

Defendant
Private Party
Business or
Govt. Agency
Business or
Govt. Agency
Private Party

Number of
Claims

Number of Percentage
Defaults of Defaults

67.2
53.8
22.1
28.7

Table VII
Outcome: Contested Cases
Plaintiff
Business or
Govt. Agency
Business or
Govt. Agency
Private Party
Private Party

Defendant
Private Party
Business or
Govt. Agency
Business or
Govt. Agency
Private Party

Number of Judgment Percentage
Cases
for Plaintiff for Plaintiff
212

173

81.6

30

19

63.3

113
251

64
173

56.6
68.9

Table VIII
Amount of Judgment: by Individual Judge
(In order of percentage for Plaintiff)
Amount of
Amount
Judgment
Percentage
Claimed
Judge
98.7
1,936.52
A
1,963.02
96.0
23,044.86
23,997.05
B
93.9
38,294.20
35,944.02
C
91.9
8,322.18
7,651.65
D
91.2
39,067.63
42,853.64
E
5,794.23
90.6
6,398.05
F
89.7
46,645.91
52,023.21
G
80.4
1,181.08
H
1,468.99
92.0
175,320.34
161,265.90
Total

Judge
A
C
B
D
G
E
H
F
Total

Table IX
Outcome: by Individual Judge
(In order of percentage for Plaintiff)
Percentage
Judgment for
Number of
for plaintiff
Plaintiff
Cases
100.0
12
12
87.8
255
224
132
87.4
151
83.9
47
556
83.4
356
297
82.2
258
314
81.8
9
11
38
74.5
51
84.4
1019
1208*

*Included in this total are two cases decided by judges not shown in
this table.
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Table X
Most Common Plaintiffs
Plaintiff

Cases decided by Judge

Maggi's
Beneficial Finance Company
Sears' Roebuck
County of Los Angeles
Atlantic Finance Company
Local Loan Company
Creditway of America
G. F. C. (Finance Company)
Ideal Loan Company
Dial Finance Company
First Thrift (Finance Company)
Driftwood Dairy
Harris & Frank
S. I. C. Finance Company
Barry's Jewelers
Hartfield-Zody's
University Lincoln-Mercury
State of California
Tate Motor Company
Avco Finance Company
Jahant General Tire Service
McMahon Furniture Company
Public Finance Company
City of La Verne
Firestone Stores
Household Finance Company
Total
Note:

46
40
35
24
23
22
16
16
16
15
13
12
11
11
10
10
10
9
9
8
8
8
8
7
7
7
401

The above twenty-six plaintiffs were involved in 33.2 per cent of
all judgments. Of the 401 cases plaintiffs won 387 (96.5 per cent).

APPENDIX B
Population and Socio-Economic Facts
of the Pomona Judicial District
Population: In 1967 the total population was 138,201 persons.
School enrollment in 1971 showed the following distribution:

59.78 per cent were white, 20.96 per cent were black, 18.25 per cent
were Mexican-American, and 1.01 per cent were other. The Pomona
Valley had a large number of senior citizens, 9 per cent over 65 years
of age compared to 7 per cent nationally. The valley also had the
largest concentration of black population between Pasadena and
San Bernardino. According to a 1969 study, the median age was 25
years, with 56 per cent under 30 years. An unusually large percentage of heads of households were female, 23 per cent of the total.
Three areas were predominately black, a large area was predominately Mexican-American, while another was predominately lowincome white, several were middle income, and a few were very
high income.
Employment: The city unemployment was a low 3.13 per cent in
1969. However, certain tracts were significantly higher (i.e. #4
was 7.68 per cent, #9 was 4.14 per cent, #16 was 6.33 per cent).
Some areas within tracts ran as high as 16.45 per cent.
The workers were basically commuters. Those who drove more
than ten miles comprised 61 per cent of the work force, with 38 per
cent driving over fifteen miles.
Income: A large percentage of the population were living on a
modest income, 32.6 per cent under $5,000. per year, and 19.6 per
cent under $3,000. Another large percentage had a very good income 39.7 per cent over $10,000 per year. Only 27.7 per cent were
in the $5,000. to $10,000. income range. This presents a rather
novel situation. Whereas a normal income distribution would have
a few persons in the low income range and a few in the high
income range with the bulk in the middle income range, the Pomona
distribution had a large percentage in both low and high income
range with only a few in the middle range.
Housing: Home owners were shown to be 53 per cent of the total
family population, with 39 per cent renting and the remainder either
living in mobile homes or with other families.
The above statistics indicate that the Pomona Valley has a large
number of poor citizens. These are comprised of retired senior
citizens, minority races and low income whites. In the same
judicial district are also a great many middle income and wealthy
citizens. Although the total population is quite large, the Valley
is made up of several small to medium towns. For this reason it
would generally be more correct to classify the judicial district as a
small to medium town as opposed to either urban or rural.
Because the Pomona Valley is essentially composed of several
small towns with a high percentage of poor citizens, who often
become "poor defendants" in small claims court, this district is
thought to provide a good sample base for such a study.
The sources of the above information were:
"Economic Data Bank of the Pomona Valley" by Gerry Findley
and Associates.
"A Look at Pomona 1969", Published by the Administrative Office,
City of Pomona.

